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We develop a consumer-level model of vehicle choice to shed light on the erosion of the 
U.S. automobile manufacturers’ market share during the past decade.  We examine the influence 
of vehicle attributes, brand loyalty, product line characteristics, and dealerships.  We find that 
nearly all of the loss in market share for U.S. manufacturers can be explained by changes in basic 
vehicle attributes, namely:  price, size, power, operating cost, transmission type, reliability, and 
body type. U.S. manufacturers have improved their vehicles’ attributes but not as much as 
Japanese and European manufacturers have improved the attributes of their vehicles. 
 Vehicle Choice Behavior and the Declining Market Share of U.S. Automakers 




 Until the energy shocks of the 1970s opened the U.S. market to foreign automakers 
by spurring consumer interest in small fuel-efficient cars, General Motors, Ford, and 
Chrysler sold nearly 9 out of every 10 new vehicles on the American road.  After gaining a 
toehold in the U.S. market, Japanese automakers, in particular, have taken significant share 
from what was once justifiably called the Big Three (table 1).  Today, about 40 percent of 
the nation’s new cars and 70 percent of its light trucks are sold by U.S. producers.
1   And 
new competitive pressures portend additional losses in share, especially in the light truck 
market—a traditional stronghold for U.S. firms partly because of a 25 percent tariff on 
light trucks built outside of North America and the historical absence of European 
automakers from this market.   Japanese automakers are building light trucks in the United 
States to avoid the tariff and introducing new minivans, SUVs, and pickups, while 
European automakers are starting to offer SUVs.  
 
Table 1. U.S. and Foreign Automakers’ Market Share of Vehicle Sales in the U.S. 
 
     Manufacturer by Geographic Origin 
   Year  US Japan  Europe 
       Market Share of Cars 
(percent) 1970  86  3  8 
   1975  82  9  7 
   1980  74  20  6 
   1985  75  20  5 
   1990  67  30  5 
   1995  61  31  5 
   2000  53  32 11 
      2005 42  40  11 
       Market Share of Light 
Trucks (percent)**  1970  91  4  4 
   1975  93  6  1 
                                                 
1  Ford and General Motors have partial ownership of some foreign automakers.  However, the industry and 
manufacturer shares reported here would not be affected very much if Ford’s and GM’s sales included, on the 
basis of their ownership shares, the sales of these automakers.     
 
   1  
 
   1980  87  11  2 
   1985  81  18  0 
   1990  84  16  0 
   1995  87  13  0 
   2000  77  19  1 
      2005  70  25  3 
      
1970 87  4  7 
Market Share of Cars 
and Light Trucks 
(percent) 1975  85  8  6 
   1980  77  18  6 
   1985  77  19  4 
   1990  72  24  3 
   1995  72  23  3 
   2000  66  26  6 
   2005  57  32  7 
 
* Shares generally do not sum to 100 because of rounding, the omission of Korean manufacturers, and 
imports that Automotive News does not assign to any manufacturer or country of origin. 
     **Light trucks include SUVs, minivans, and pickups weighing over 6000 pounds.     
         Source: Automotive News Market Data Book (1980-2006) 
 
The domestic industry’s loss in market share is not attributable to the problems 
experienced by any one automaker (table 2).  Indeed, GM, Ford, and Chrysler are all losing 
market share at the same time.  Toyota has recently surpassed Ford as the second largest 
seller of new cars in the United States and Honda has surpassed Chrysler (notwithstanding 
Chrysler’s merger with Daimler-Benz in 1998) and is within reach of Ford.  Both 
companies as well as Nissan (not shown) are also likely to increase their share of the light 
truck market as their new offerings become available.  On the other hand, General Motors’ 
share of new car and light truck sales has not been so low since the 1920s.   
 
Table 2. “Big Three” and Selected Foreign Automakers’ Market Share of  
Vehicle Sales in the U.S. 
 
 
     Manufacturer 






(Domestic) Toyota Honda 
         Market Share of Cars 
(percent)  1970 40  26  16  2  0 
   1975  44  23  11 3  1 
   1980  46  17  9 6  4  
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   1985  43  19  11 5  5 
   1990  36  21  9 8  9 
   1995  31  21  9 9  9 
   2000  28  17  8 11  10 
 2005  22  13  9  16  11 
           Market Share of Light 
Trucks (percent)*  1970 38  38  9  1  0 
   1975  42  31  15 2  0 
   1980  39  33  11 6  0 
   1985  36  27  14 7  0 
   1990  35  30  14 6  0 
   1995  31  33  16 5  1 
   2000  28  28  15 8  3 
 2005  30  23  18  11  6 
           Market Share of Cars and 
Light Trucks (percent) 
1970 40  28  15  2  0 
   1975  43  25  12 3  1 
   1980  45  20  9 6  3 
   1985  41  21  12 6  4 
   1990  35  24  11 8  6 
   1995  31  26  12 7  5 
   2000  28  23  12 9  7 
   2005  26  19  14  13  9 
 
*Light trucks include SUVs, minivans, and pickups weighing over 6000 pounds.  AMC/Jeep was acquired by 
Chrysler in 1987, but is not included in Chrysler’s share to maintain consistency over time. Source: 
Automotive News Market Data Book (1980-2006) 
 
  
  It may be believed that the industry’s losses in share are confined to certain 
geographical regions of the country such as parts of the East and West Coasts and some 
affluent areas in the Southwest.  However, Japanese and European automakers have built 
manufacturing plants and research and development facilities in the Midwest and 
Mid-south that have spurred local employment and helped increase market share in these 
areas because American consumers no longer view auto “imports” as costing themselves 
or their friends a job.  In addition, during the past decade Japanese automakers in particular 
have significantly expanded their dealer network in interior regions of the country.    
The forces that cause a tight oligopoly to lose its market dominance are central to 
our understanding of competition and industry performance.  Academic researchers, 
industry analysts, and even industry executives have offered various supply-side and  
 
   3  
 
demand-side explanations for the U.S. automakers’ decline.  Aizcorbe, Winston, and 
Friedlaender (1987) found that Japanese automakers were able to build an additional small 
car during the 1970s and early 1980s for $1,300 to $2,000 less than it cost the U.S. 
automakers to build the same car.  This cost advantage translated into greater market share 
for the Japanese firms.  However, recent evidence compiled by Harbour and Associates 
suggests that the U.S.-Japanese cost differential has narrowed.
2  For example, an average 
GM vehicle now requires 24 hours of assembly time while an average Honda North 
American vehicle requires 22.3 hours. Compared with Japanese transplants, American 
plants have also significantly reduced the labor that they require to build a car.  
Recently, industry executives such as Bill Ford of Ford and Rick Wagoner of 
General Motors have argued that their competitive position has been eroded by rising 
health care and pension costs and an undervalued yen.  They have called on the federal 
government to provide the industry with various subsidies and tax breaks and to pressure 
Japan to raise the value of its currency.  However, the U.S. industry’s market share has 
been declining long before it began to incur the costs of an aging workforce and has 
continued to decline during times when the dollar/yen exchange rate was quite favorable 
for U.S. automakers.  
From a consumer’s perspective, Japanese automakers have developed a reputation 
for building high-quality products that suggests that their technology in cars represents 
better value than American technology in cars.  Indeed, using various measures of quality 
and reliability, widely-cited publications such as Consumer Reports and the J.D. Power 
Report have generally given their highest ratings in the past few decades to cars made by 
Japanese and European manufacturers rather than by American manufacturers.  Changes in 
market share since the 1970s could therefore be explained by the relative value of the 
technology in domestic and foreign producers’ vehicles as captured in basic vehicle 
attributes such as price, fuel economy, power and so on.  
Consumers’ preferences may also be affected by more subtle attributes of a vehicle 
such as the feel of a stereo knob and the shine of plastics used in interiors.   Robert Lutz, 
General Motors’ vice chairman for product development, claims that attention to these 
subtle attributes sends a powerful message to consumers that an automaker cares about its 
                                                 
2 A summary is contained in Automotive News email alert June 2, 2005.  
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products.
3 An even more subtle consideration is consumers’ unobserved tastes that are 
expressed, as John DeLorean colorfully put it, in whether their eyes light up when they 
walk through an automaker’s showroom and whether they buy a car that they are in love 
with.
4  U.S. automakers may have lost market share because of the poor workmanship of 
their products or factors that while difficult to quantify have adversely influenced 
consumers’ tastes toward domestic vehicles.   
Brand loyalty is inextricably related to developing, maintaining, and protecting 
market share.  Mannering and Winston (1991) found that a significant fraction of GM’s 
loss in market share during the 1980s could be explained by the stronger brand loyalty that 
American consumers developed toward Japanese producers’ vehicles compared with the 
loyalty that they had for American producers’ vehicles.  Ford and Chrysler were able to 
retain their share during that period, but the American firms’ subsequent losses in share 
may be partly attributable to the intensity of consumer loyalty toward Japanese and 
European automakers.  
Economic theory suggests that product line rivalry may be an important feature of 
competition in the passenger-vehicle market because consumers have strongly varying 
preferences.  Industry analysts stress that it is important for automakers to develop 
attractive product lines that anticipate and respond quickly to changes in consumer 
preferences.  General Motors, for example, has offered an assortment of vehicles that 
missed major trends such as the growth in the small-car market in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, the interest in more aerodynamic midsize cars in the late 1980s, and the rise of sport 
utility vehicles based on pickup truck designs in the 1990s.  Two key features of an 
automaker’s product line are the range of vehicles that are offered and whether any 
particular vehicle generates “buzz” that spurs sales of all of the automaker’s vehicles.  
Finally, the competitiveness of a product line is also affected by an automaker’s network of 
dealers.  Changes in market share since the 1970s could therefore reflect the relative 
strengths of domestic and foreign manufacturers’ product lines and distribution systems.  
Given the myriad of hypotheses that have been offered, it is useful to empirically 
assess as many of them as possible.  This paper develops a model of consumer vehicle 
                                                 
3 Danny Hakim,  “G.M. Executive Preaches: Sweat the Smallest Details,” New York Times, January 5, 2004. 
4 Danny Hakim, “Detroit’s New Crisis Could Be its Worst,” New York Times, March 27, 2005.  
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choice to investigate the major potential causes of the domestic industry’s shrinking 
market share.  A long line of research beginning with Lave and Train (1979), Manski and 
Sherman (1980), Mannering and Winston (1985), and Train (1986) indicates that such 
models are a natural way to quantify a variety of influences on consumers’ behavior, some 
of which may prove useful for understanding the industry’s decline.  However, these 
models have accumulated  several specification and estimation concerns including: the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption maintained by the multinomial 
logit model that is often used to analyze choices; the possibility that vehicle price is 
endogenous because it is related to unobserved vehicle attributes; the importance of 
accounting for heterogeneity among vehicle consumers; and the appropriate treatment of 
dynamic influences on choice such as brand loyalty.   
We  explore these concerns in the process of estimating the choices of U.S. 
consumers who acquired new vehicles in 2000.  Although we do not claim to provide 
definitive solutions to all of the methodological issues that we confront, we do obtain 
plausible evidence that choices are strongly influenced by vehicle attributes, brand loyalty, 
and automobile dealerships but surprisingly they are not affected by product line 
characteristics. We use the choice model to simulate market shares under alternative 
scenarios to explore the reasons for the loss in market share by U.S. manufacturers.  
We find that the U.S. industry’s loss in share during the past decade can be 
explained almost entirely by relative changes in the most basic attributes of new vehicles, 
namely price, size, power, operating cost, transmission type, reliability, and body type. The 
result is surprising in its simplicity, implying that it is not necessary to resort to the plethora 
of explanations just described.  Arguments based on subtle attributes such as the design of 
interior features, unobserved responses by consumers to vehicle offerings, or even 
measurable attributes beyond those listed above do not play a measurable role in the 
industry’s competitive problems. Similarly, changes in loyalty patterns, whether an 
automaker’s product line is broad or narrow or includes a hot car, and changes in 
dealership networks do not contribute much to the industry’s decline.  Our finding suggests 
that U.S. automobile executives should focus more attention on understanding why their 
companies seem unable to improve the basic attributes of their vehicles as rapidly as their  
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foreign competitors are able to improve their vehicles’ basic attributes, and try to remedy 
the situation.   
 
2. Choice of Model and its Formulation 
 
Our objective is to investigate the most likely determinants of market share changes 
in the new vehicle market during the past decade.  The approach we take is to estimate the 
conditional choice of buying a new car.  In a complete vehicle choice model, consumers 
can choose to buy a new car, buy any used car, continue using their current vehicles, or not 
own any vehicle and presumably rely on pubic transportation.  Our model, which accounts 
for unobserved taste variation and is conditional on a subset of the vehicle choice 
alternatives (i.e., new car purchases), could yield inconsistent estimates if tastes that affect 
which new car the consumer chooses also affect whether the consumer chooses one of 
these cars instead of another alternative.  It is thus useful to discuss the advantages and 
drawbacks of different approaches to analyzing new vehicle choices before formulating 
our model.  
 
Controlling for related choices 
  One approach to the problem of related choices that is taken, for example, by Berry, 
Levinsohn, and Pakes (2004), is to aggregate all the other alternatives into one 
alternative—which is often called an outside good.  The weakness of this approach is that it 
is difficult to specify attributes that meaningfully represent this alternative.  Thus, 
including an outside good is still likely to yield inconsistent estimates because unobserved 
tastes that affect a consumer’s assessment of new cars can also affect a consumer’s 
assessment of other alternatives through the attributes of those alternatives.  For example, 
the value that consumers place on vehicle price affects their evaluation of each used car 
based on a used car’s price, not just on the existence of an unspecified outside good.
5   
A further difficulty with using an outside good is that the sample of new car buyers 
                                                 
5 The utility of the outside good is usually specified as a function of demographic characteristics and random 
terms.  Although these elements tend to have significant effects, indicating that they are capturing differences 
between people who buy the good and those who do not, the utility of the outside good is not structural  
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needs to be weighted to be consistent with the general population.  These weights differ 
greatly over observations, because the subpopulation of new car buyers is quite different 
from the general population.  Thus, the density of tastes among the subpopulation of new 
vehicle buyers is derived as being proportional to the population density times the 
probability of a buying a new car.  But this probability is influenced by the attributes of 
other alternatives including but not limited to all used and currently owned vehicles.  
However, as noted, an outside good does not control for these attributes; hence, the 
conditional density is likely to be incorrectly inferred from the population density.   
In our view, the distribution of preferences among new car buyers can be estimated 
more accurately by estimating it directly on a sample of new car buyers and by conducting 
extensive tests of error components that capture vehicle attributes and socioeconomic 
variables that are likely to affect consumers’ new vehicle choices as well as their related 
choices.  Our approach also has the practical advantage that it can include explanatory 
variables whose distributions are not known for the general population.  In contrast, the 
outside good approach restricts the set of explanatory variables to those whose 
distributions in the U.S. population are known, because the population distribution is used 
to weight the sample.  Thus, we would be precluded from exploring, among other 
influences, the impact of brand loyalty and an automaker’s network on vehicle choice 
because measures of these effects are very difficult to obtain for the general population.
6    
Of course, the issues raised here could potentially be avoided by analyzing a 
complete model of vehicle ownership.  The problems posed by this approach are cost and 
empirical tractability.  As noted later, we must conduct a customized survey of households 
to collect information on such variables as past vehicle purchases, vehicles seriously 
considered when selecting a new vehicle, and so on.  This information is not included in 
publicly available surveys.  Customized surveys are expensive—in our case, the cost was 
roughly $50 per household.  Households that actually acquire a new vehicle represent 
roughly 12 percent of the general population of households.  Thus, the cost of assembling a 
                                                                                                                                                 
because it does not relate to the attributes of the alternatives that are subsumed into the aggregate “outside 
good.” 
6  By conditioning choices on the purchase of a new vehicle, we are precluded from analyzing or forecasting 
changes in market size.  However, we are interested in decomposing potential influences on changes in 
market shares, especially the decline in the U.S. manufacturers’ share.  We can conduct this analysis without 
having to control for changes in market size.   
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sample of all households in the population, which would be necessary to analyze the choice 
of whether a consumer decides to acquire a vehicle, would run into the hundreds of 
thousands of dollars.  For those households who actually purchase a vehicle, we would 
have to analyze whether they selected a new or used vehicle, which would result in an 
enormous choice set that could not be reduced because our model does not invoke the IIA 
assumption.  Finally, even a complete model of vehicle ownership is open to the criticism 
that it is conditional on other related decisions such as mode choice to work and residential 
location.  Using our approach as a starting point, future research can consider the trade-off 
between additional modeling and costly data collection and possible improvements in the 
accuracy of parameter estimates.      
 
Model formulation  
Our analysis is based on a random utility function that characterizes consumers’ 
choices of new vehicles by make (e.g., Toyota) and model (e.g., Camry). A mixed logit 
model relates this choice to the average utility of each make and model (i.e., average over 
consumers), the variation in utility that relates to consumers’ observed characteristics, and 
the variation in utility that is purely random and does not relate to observed consumer 
characteristics. In an auxiliary regression equation, the average utility of each make and 
model is related to the observed attributes of the vehicle, using an estimation procedure that 
accounts for the possible endogeneity of vehicle prices. 
We index consumers by n =1,...,N, and the available makes and models of new 
vehicles by j =1,...,J.  The utility, Unj , that consumer n derives from vehicle j is given by:  
(1)     nj nj n nj j nj w x U ε µ β δ + ′ + ′ + = , 
where j δ  is “average” utility (or, more precisely, the portion of utility that is the same for 
all consumers
7), nj x  is a vector of consumer characteristics interacted with vehicle 
attributes, product line and distribution variables, and brand loyalties (capturing observed 
                                                 
7 The explanatory variables  nj x  have non-zero mean in general, thus average utility is actually  j δ   plus the 
mean of  nj x β ′ . We use the term “average utility” to refer to  j δ  because other terms, such as “common  
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heterogeneity);  β  represents the mean coefficient for each of these variables in the 
population; nj w  is a vector of vehicle attributes that may be interacted with consumer 
characteristics (capturing unobserved heterogeneity); n µ is a vector of random terms with 
zero mean that corresponds to vector elements in nj w ; and nj ε is a random scalar that 
captures all remaining elements of utility provided by vehicle j to consumer n.   
Brownstone and Train (1999) point out that the terms nj nw µ′ represent random 
coefficients and/or error components. Each term in nj nw µ′ is an unobserved component of 
utility that induces correlation and non-proportional substitution between vehicles, thus 
overcoming the IIA restriction imposed by the standard logit model.  Note that elements of 
nj w can correspond to an element of nj x , in which case the corresponding element of β 
represents the average coefficient and the corresponding element of  n µ captures random 
variation around this average. Elements of nj w that do not correspond to elements of nj x can 
be interpreted as capturing a random coefficient with zero mean. 
Denote the density of n µ  as f(µ | σ), which depends on parameters σ that represent, 
for example, the covariance of n µ .  Note that f is the density conditional on a new vehicle 
purchase and may therefore depend on observed variables in the model that arise from a 
consumer’s optimizing behavior that leads to a new vehicle purchase.  We explore the 
empirical form of f and its dependence on observed variables as part of our estimation.  
We assume that nj ε is iid extreme value.  Note that the average utility associated 
with omitted attributes, which varies over vehicles, is absorbed into  j δ .  Given the 
distributional assumption on nj ε , the probability that consumer n chooses alternative i is 




                                                                                                                                                 
utility” or “fixed portion of utility,” seem less intuitive. The main point is that  j δ  does not vary over 
consumers while the other portions of utility do.  
8 These references are for mixed logits on consumer-level choice data. Mixed logits on market share data 
have been estimated by Boyd and Mellman (1980), Cardell and Dunbar (1980), and more recently revived by 
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995).  
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(2)       ∫
∑
′ + ′ +
′ + ′ +













) ( . 
McFadden and Train (2000) demonstrate that by making an appropriate choice of variables 
and mixing distribution, a model taking this form can approximate any random utility 
model—and pattern of vehicle substitution—to any level of accuracy.  
  Market (or aggregate) demand is the sum of individual consumers’ demand.  The 
true (observed) share of consumers buying vehicle i is i S .  As in Berry, Levinsohn, and 
Pakes (2004) and Goolsbee and Petrin (2004), we use market shares rather than sample 
shares to avoid the sampling variance associated with the latter shares. The predicted share, 
denoted ) , ( ˆ δ θ i S   , is obtained by calculating ni P with parameters θ  =  {β,σ} 
and {} J δ δ δ , , 1 K = and averaging ni P over the N  consumers in the sample.  Berry (1994) 
has shown that for any value of θ, a unique δ exists such that the predicted market shares 
equal the actual market shares.  This fact allows δ to be expressed as a function of θ, 
thereby reducing the number of parameters that enter the likelihood function. We denote 
δ(θ,S), where {} J S S S , , 1 K = , as satisfying the relation:  
(3)   J i N S P S S S
n
i n i i , , 1 / )) , ( , ( )) , ( , ( ˆ K = = = ∑ θ δ θ θ δ θ . 
The parameters of the choice model θ are estimated by maximum likelihood procedures 
described below, while δ is calculated such that predicted market shares match observed 
market shares at θ.   
The alternative-specific constant for each vehicle, ) , ( S j θ δ , captures the average 
utility associated with observed as well as unobserved attributes, while the variables that 
enter the random utility model capture the variation of utility among consumers. To 
complete the model, we specify average utility as a function of vehicle attributes, z, with 
parameters, α, that do not vary over consumers:  
(4)     j j j z S ξ α θ δ + ′ = ) , ( ,       
            
where j ξ captures the average utility associated with omitted vehicle attributes.  Note that 
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elements of nj w  in the random utility function given in equation (1) can correspond to an 
element of j z . 
Vehicle price, an element of  j z , is likely to be affected by unobserved attributes, so 
that  j ξ does not have a zero mean conditional on j z .  To address this problem, let j y be a 
vector of instruments that includes the non-price elements of j z plus other exogenous 
variables that we discuss below. The assumption that ( ) 0 = j j y E ξ  for all j is sufficient for 
the instrumental variables estimator of α to be consistent and asymptotically normal, given 
θ.  
 
3. Estimation Procedures 
 
Estimation of the random utility function presented here is complicated by our 
efforts to capture preference heterogeneity (i.e., σ ), the average utility for each make and 
model (i.e., δ), and the effect of brand loyalty on vehicle choice. We discuss each of these 
issues in turn. 
 
Preference heterogeneity and vehicles considered 
The set of vehicles that consumers consider before making a purchase provides 
additional information on their tastes that may be useful in identifying preference 
heterogeneity.  We therefore asked consumers in our sample to list the vehicles that they 
seriously considered in addition to the vehicle that they purchased.   Most consumers 
indicated that they considered only one vehicle besides their chosen vehicle; no consumer 
listed more than five vehicles. 
We included this information in estimating the choice model by treating the chosen 
vehicle and the vehicles that were seriously considered as constituting a ranking. 
Consumers who indicated only one “considered” vehicle generated a utility ranking of   
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nj nh ni U U U > >  for all h i j , ≠  for chosen vehicle i and considered vehicle h.   Consumers 
who indicated more than one considered vehicle generated a utility ranking in the order 
that they listed the vehicles.  
Luce and Suppes (1965) demonstrated that when the unobserved component of 
utility is iid extreme value, the probability of a utility ranking, starting with the first-ranked 
alternative, is a product of logit formulas. Therefore, conditional on n µ , the 
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where the sum in the second logit formula is over all vehicles except i. The probability of 
the consumer’s ranking conditional on n µ  is defined analogously for consumers who listed 
more than one considered vehicle. The unconditional probability of the consumer’s 
ranking is then:  
(6)     ()( ) µ σ µ µ d f L R n n ∫ = . 
We found in preliminary estimations that it was essential to include the vehicles 
that consumers considered to estimate the distribution of their tastes.  When we included 
only the choice of the vehicle that consumers purchased, the parameters of the systematic 
part of the model were hardly affected but we were unable to obtain any statistically 
significant error components.  In contrast, the standard deviations for several elements 
of n µ were found to be significant when we included the vehicles that consumers seriously 
considered.  Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (2004) also reported that they were unable to 
estimate unobserved taste variation without including consumers’ rankings.  
 
Average preferences 
We included dummy variables for all the makes and models in our sample to  
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estimate consumers’ average value of utility from each vehicle.  In the numerical search for 
the maximum of the likelihood function (see below), δ is calculated for each trial value of θ.  
We use the contraction procedure developed by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) where 
at any given value of θ, the following formula is applied iteratively until predicted shares 
equal observed market shares (within a given tolerance):  
  (7) 
 
As in previous applications of this procedure, we found that the algorithm attains 
convergence quickly.  
 
Brand loyalty 
Brand loyalty has been a crucial consideration in automobile demand analysis 
beginning with Manski and Sherman (1980), who included a transactions dummy variable 
in their vehicle choice model, Mannering and Winston (1985), who included lagged 
utilization variables, and Mannering and Winston (1991), who included “brand loyalty” 
variables defined as the number of previous consecutive purchases from the same 
manufacturer.  We use the last measure of brand loyalty here.  The notion of brand loyalty 
suggests that households may behave myopically with respect to their vehicle ownership 
decisions—that is, they do not take full account of the impact of their present consumption 
of automobiles on future tastes.  Indeed, households do appear to behave myopically as 
indicated by high implicit discount rates based on vehicle purchase decisions (Mannering 
and Winston (1985)) and by frequent breaks in loyalty. Accordingly, researchers have not 
modeled consumers’ vehicle choices as arising from the maximization of an intertemporal 
utility function subject to an intertemporal budget constraint.   
We specify separate brand loyalty variables in our model for GM, Ford, Chrysler, 
Japanese manufacturers as a group, European manufacturers as a group, and Korean 
manufacturers as a group.  However, care must be taken when interpreting these 
coefficients (Mannering and Winston (1991)).  One interpretation, which is based on the 
idea of  state dependence that we are attempting to capture, posits that a consumer’s 
ownership experience with a manufacturer’s products builds confidence in that 
manufacturer (e.g., reduces perceived risk) thereby producing a greater likelihood that a 
() ()( ) ( ) ( ) . , , 1 ) , ( , ˆ ln ln , ,






j K = − + =
− − θ δ θ θ δ θ δ 
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consumer will buy the manufacturer’s products in the future.  Consumers’ actual 
experiences with a manufacturer’s vehicles determine the intensity of their 
loyalty—positive experiences are reflected in a large coefficient for the manufacturer’s 
loyalty variable. An alternative interpretation is that the loyalty variable captures 
unobserved taste heterogeneity among consumers that is not controlled for elsewhere in the 
model: previous purchases reflect consumers’ tastes that influence their current purchase. 
As Heckman (1991) pointed out, state dependence and consumer heterogeneity are 
fundamentally indistinguishable unless one imposes some structure on the way observed 
and unobserved variables interact.  In our case, we contend that it is more likely that brand 
loyalty is capturing state dependence rather than heterogeneity because it is defined for 
manufacturers that produce a wide range of vehicles, especially when Japanese and 
European vehicles are each considered as a group.  Unobserved heterogeneity is more 
likely to be associated with makes and models than with manufacturers.  For example, if a 
middle-aged male bought a Honda S2000 in the past because it best matched his tastes, 
then, based on his revealed tastes, it is reasonable to expect that he would be more likely to 
buy a Porsche Boxer or a Mercedes SLK in his current choice than to buy a Honda Accord 
or Toyota Camry.   
Our brand loyalty variables could nevertheless be subject to endogeneity bias to the 
extent that they relate to unobserved tastes for vehicle attributes; that is, the distribution of 
random terms in the choice model may be different conditional on different values of the 
brand loyalty variables. Heckman (1981a,b) pioneered the development of dynamic 
discrete choice models with lagged dependent variables and serially correlated errors, 
recognizing the critical role of initial conditions.  However, applying his methods to 
address the possible bias of brand loyalty coefficients is thwarted by formidable data and 
computational requirements.  First, we would have to obtain data for all sampled 
consumers indicating their vehicle choices and the attributes of the vehicles that were 
available at the time of each previous purchase beginning with the first vehicle that they 
ever purchased.  Second, we would have to simultaneously estimate previous and current 
vehicle choice probabilities incorporating these data and a plausible specification of how 
consumers’ tastes are likely to change over time.  
We therefore take a simpler and more tractable approach that while not necessarily  
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leading to a consistent stochastic structure, can be expected to capture the primary 
differences in the error distribution of the random utility function conditional on our brand 
loyalty variables. As reported later, we also estimate the model without any loyalty 
variables and find that the estimates for all other parameters are nearly the same with and 
without the loyalty variables.  Hence, any inconsistency that is induced by the loyalty 
variables and our treatment of the conditional error distribution is confined to the loyalty 
parameters themselves and does not affect other parameters. 
We represent the information contained in the loyalty variables about consumers’ 
preferences across manufacturers by denoting each consumer’s manufacturer preference 
as nm η , with m =1,...,6 indexing the six manufacturer groups (GM, Ford, Chrysler, Japanese, 
European, and Korean.)  These preferences result from the manufacturers’ offerings and 
consumers’ tastes for the vehicles’ attributes.  In the past, consumer n  chose the 
manufacturer with the highest value of nm η .  The unconditional distribution 
of {} 6 1 , , n n n η η η K = is ) ( n g η .  The distribution of n η conditional on the consumer having 
chosen manufacturer m is:  
 
(8)   () ( ) ( )
() ( ) ∫ ≠ ∀ >
≠ ∀ >
= ≠ ∀ >
n n ns nm
n ns nm
ns nm n
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m s h
η η η η
η η η
η η η , 
 
where I(·) is a 0-1 indicator of whether the statement in parentheses is true. 
For the current choice, the utility of vehicle j, which is produced by manufacturer 
s(j), is as previously specified plus a term ns λη , where λ is the coefficient of the additional 
element of utility. Conditional on the past choice of manufacturer, the choice probability is 
then the logit formula with this term added to its argument, integrated over the conditional 
density of n η .  Formally, the probability that consumer n chooses vehicle i produced by 
manufacturer s(i), given that the consumer chose a vehicle by manufacturer m in the past 
(where m may equal s(i)) is: 








j ns nj nj j
i ns ni n ni i
η µ η η η σ µ
λη µ β δ
λη µ β δ
≠ ∀ > =∫∫
∑
=
+ ′ + ′ +






   16  
 
 
This choice probability is a mixed logit with an extra error component whose distribution is 
conditioned on the consumer’s past choice of manufacturer. Similarly, the probability for 
the observed choices of consumer n , who for instance bought vehicle i and ranked vehicle 
h as second, is the same as equation (5) but expanded to include the extra error component:  
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Note we also account for additional ranked choices as appropriate. 
 
Estimators 
The choice probabilities, ni P , in equation (9) and the ranking probabilities, n R , in 
equation  (10), are integrals with no closed form solution. We use simulation to 
approximate the integrals. The simulated choice probability is: 
 




+ ′ + ′ +







ni j rns nj d nj j









) ( 1 ~
λη µ β θ δ
λη µ β θ δ
 , 
 
for draws D d d , , 1 , K = µ from density f(µ | σ) and draws from the conditional distribution  




The simulated log-likelihood function for the observed first and ranked choices in 
the sample is  ∑ =
n
LL ln n R
~
, which is maximized with respect to parameters θ = {β,σ} and 
λ.  As described above, estimates of   { } J δ δ δ , , 1 K =   are obtained using the iteration  
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formula in equation (7) to ensure that predicted shares equal observed market shares.
9  
Goolsbee and Petrin (2004) also use maximum likelihood procedures to estimate choice 
probabilities. Petrin (2002) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (2004) used a generalized 
method of moments estimator with moments based on consumer-level choices.     
We use 200 Halton draws for simulation.
10    Halton draws are a type of 
low-discrepancy sequence that, as R rises, has coverage properties that are superior to 
pseudo-random draws.  For example, Bhat (2001) and Train (2000) found that 100 Halton 
draws achieved greater accuracy in mixed logit estimations than 1000 pseudo-random 
draws.
11  To estimate the impact of different numbers of draws on parameter estimates, we 
estimated the model using 100, 150, and 200 draws. The estimates differed an average of 8 
percent when we increased the number of draws from 100 to 150 and differed an average of 
4 percent when we increased the number of draws from 150 to 200. The differences are 
well within the confidence intervals for the parameters and indicate that simulation noise 
and bias are sufficiently small to not warrant further increases in the number of draws.   In 
addition, we evaluated the log-likelihood function, gradient and Hessian using 400 draws 
at the parameter estimates obtained with 200 draws. The average log-likehood changed 
only very slightly, from -6.5163 to -6.5141. The test statistic  g H g
1 − ′ , where g  is the 
gradient vector and H is the Hessian, took the value 0.00351. Under the null hypothesis that 
the gradient is zero, this test statistic is distributed chi-squared with degrees of freedom 
equal to the number of parameters. The extremely low value indicates that we cannot reject 
                                                 
9 Our sample size is small relative to the number of available makes and models, and thus relative to the 
number of elements in δ .   However, this is not problematic because observed market shares rather than 
sample shares are used to determine δ .  Note that the sample of new vehicle buyers is large relative to the 
number of elements in θ that reflect differences in preferences among households, and it is this sample that is 
used to estimate θ.    
10  Draws from the conditional distribution h were obtained by an accept/reject procedure: draw values 
of n η from g( n η ) and retain those for which  ns nm η η > for all  m s ≠ . We assume g( n η ) is a product of 
standard normal variables and use 200 accepted draws in the simulation of the integral over n η . 
 
11 Other forms of quasi-random draws have been investigated for use in maximum simulated likelihood 
estimation of choice models. Sándor and Train (2004) explore (t,m,s)-nets, which include Sobol, Faure, 
Niederreiter and other sequences. They find that Halton draws performed marginally better than two types of 
nets and marginally worse than two others, and that all the quasi-random methods vastly outperformed 
pseudo-random draws. In high dimensions, when Halton draws tend to be highly correlated over dimensions, 
Bhat (2003) has investigated the use of scrambled Halton draws, and Hess et al. (2006) propose modified 
Latin hypercube sampling procedures. The dimension of integration in our model is not sufficiently high to 
require these procedures.  
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the hypothesis that the gradient using 400 draws is zero at the estimates using 200 draws at 
any meaningful level of significance. For these reasons, we concluded that using 200 
Halton draws for simulation was sufficient. We report robust standard errors that take into 
account simulation noise, as suggested by McFadden and Train (2000).  
After estimating the ranked choice probabilities, we estimate the regression given 
by equation (4), which relates the  alternative-specific constants that capture average 
utilities to vehicle attributes.  As noted, we use instrumental variables because price is 
likely to be correlated with omitted attributes.  Nash equilibrium in prices implies that the 
price of each vehicle depends on the attributes of all the other vehicles, which indicates that 
appropriate instruments can be constructed from these attributes because they are unlikely 
to be correlated with a given vehicle’s omitted attributes.  Letting ji d be the difference in an 
attribute, say fuel economy, between vehicle j and i, we calculate four instruments for 
vehicle i for each attribute: the sum of  ji d over all j made by the same manufacturer, the 
sum of  ji d  over all j made by competing manufacturers, the sum of 
2
ji d over all j made by 
the same manufacturer, and the sum of  
2
ji d  over all j by competing manufacturers.  
The four measures are the instruments obtained from the exchangeable basis 
developed by Pakes (1994). The first two have been used by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 
(1995) and Petrin (2002). The latter two measures, which have not been used before, 
capture the extent to which other vehicles’ non-price attributes differ from vehicle i’s 
non-price attributes.  We found them to be quite useful in our estimations because without 
them parameter estimates tended to be less stable across alternative specifications.   
Estimation of the first stage regressions for price and retained value (the two 
endogenous variables described further below) obtained R-squares of 0.82 and 0.83 
respectively.  Based on F-tests, the hypotheses that all instruments have zero coefficients 
and that the extra instruments that do not also enter as explanatory variables in the second 
stage have zero coefficients, can be rejected at the 99 percent confidence level. We should 
point out, however, that use of the instruments assumes that unobserved attributes, while 
correlated with price, are independent of the observed non-price attributes of vehicles. This 
assumption, previously maintained by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995, 2004) and 
Petrin (2002), is justified to some extent by pragmatic considerations. In future work, it  
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would be useful to explore the possibility of and remedies to any endogeneity in observed 
non-price attributes. 
 
4. Model Specification, Data, and Estimation Results 
 
  The random utility function in equation (1) posits that consumers’ vehicle choices 
and their ranking of vehicles that they seriously considered are determined by vehicle 
attributes, their socioeconomic characteristics and brand loyalty, and an automaker’s 
product line and distribution network.  The regression model specifies the average utility of 
a given make and model as a function of vehicle attributes.  
In addition to a vehicle’s purchase price, the attributes that we include in the models 
are fuel economy, horsepower, curb weight, length, wheelbase, reliability, transmission 
type, and size classifications. These attributes encompass those used in previous research.  
Other safety-related variables such as airbags and antilock brakes were not included 
because most vehicles in our sample were equipped with them.  Because automobiles are a 
capital good, consumers’ choices may also be influenced by their expectations of how 
much a vehicle’s value will depreciate.  We therefore include as a separate variable the 
percentage of a vehicle’s purchase price in 2000 (consistent with the sample discussed 
below) that it is expected to retain after two years of ownership. Calculating the retained 
value based on three years of ownership produced a slightly worse fit than using two years 
of ownership, while calculating the value based on four years of ownership produced a 
noticeably worse fit.  We expect that consumers are more likely to select a vehicle that 
retains its value (i.e., the coefficient should have a positive sign) because it could be sold or 
traded in for a higher price than a vehicle that retains little of its value. As noted, we 
measure brand loyalty by a consumer’s consecutive purchases of the same brand of vehicle.  
The socioeconomic characteristics that we include are sex, age, income, residential 
location, and family size.  
Our specification extends previous vehicle demand models by exploring the effect 
of automakers’ product line and distribution network on choice.  Researchers have 
typically used brand preference dummy variables to capture these influences.  Economic 
theory suggests that broad product lines can create first mover advantages to a firm and  
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overcome limited information in a market; thus, we specify the number of distinct models 
(i.e., nameplates) offered by an automaker to capture these possible effects.  During the 
past decade, GM in particular has been criticized for offering too many models that are 
essentially the same vehicle, suggesting that the sign of this variable may vary by 
automaker.  Industry analysts stress that automakers benefit from having a “hot car” in 
their product line because it may draw attention to other vehicles that they produce.  For 
many decades, a well-known axiom among the Big Three was: “bring them into the 
showroom with a convertible, and sell them a station wagon.” Recently, GM tried to get 
buzz for the Pontiac G6 sedan that it hoped would spillover to its other products by giving 
away 276 of these vehicles on Oprah Winfrey’s television show.  We constructed a dummy 
variable that indicated whether a manufacturer produced a hot car, where a hot car was 
defined as having sales equal to the mean sales of its subclass plus twice the standard 
deviation of sales.  (We also explored other definitions.)  An automaker’s network of 
dealers distributes its products to potential customers; thus, we also include the number of 
each manufacturing division’s dealerships.  
We performed estimations based on a random sample of 458 consumers who 
acquired—that is, paid cash, financed, or leased—a new 2000 model year vehicle.
12 
Although these consumers differed in how they financed a vehicle, we found that their 
choice model parameters were not statistically different and thus combined them to 
estimate a single model. The sample was drawn from a panel of 250,000 nationally 
representative U.S. households that is aligned with demographic data from the Current 
Population Survey of the U.S. Bureau of the Census. The panel is administered by National 
Family Opinion, Inc., and managed by Allison-Fisher, Inc.  The response rate for our 
sample exceeded 70 percent.  The data consist of consumers’ new vehicle choices by make 
and model, their ranking of the vehicles they seriously considered acquiring, vehicle 
ownership histories, which are used to construct the brand loyalty variables, and 
socioeconomic characteristics.  Vehicle attributes and product line variables are from 
issues of Consumer Reports, the Market Data Book published by Automotive News, and 
                                                 
12 The sample size is limited by our requiring data for each consumer on the number of dealers within 50 
miles that sell each make/model of vehicle and consumers’ vehicle ownership histories and rankings of 
vehicles they considered in their 2000 choice.  This information is not available from standard surveys such 
as the CES.  Our survey enabled us to obtain the information, but at a high cost per respondent.    
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Wards’ Automotive Yearbook.  We follow previous research and use the manufacturer 
suggested retail price, MSRP, for the purchase price. Although manufacturers discount 
these prices with various incentives, such as cash rebates and interest free loans, during our 
sample period the difference between the incentives offered by American, Japanese, and 
European manufacturers as a percentage of the retail prices of their vehicles was quite 
small.  Vehicles’ expected retained values were obtained from the Kelley Blue Book: 
Residual Value Guide.  The number of division dealerships within 50 miles of a 
respondent’s zip code was obtained from the automakers’ websites. A 50-mile radius 
seems appropriate for our analysis because CNW Marketing Research found that 
consumers travel 22 miles, on average, to acquire a new vehicle. In addition, some 
automakers’ web pages only display dealerships within 50 miles of the inputted zip code. 
Table 3 provides some descriptive information about the sample.  It is difficult to 
obtain population data to assess the sample because it is conditional on a consumer 
acquiring a new 2000 model year vehicle.  However, as noted, the sample is derived from a 
panel of U.S. households whose demographics are consistent with national figures; 
accordingly, the sample values of the socioeconomic characteristics appear to be 
representative.  Moreover, the sample market shares of the manufacturers by geographic 
origin are well-aligned with the national market shares reported in table 1.  
 
Table 3. Description of the Sample 
(Consumers who acquired a new vehicle in the year 2000) 
 
Socioeconomic Characteristics   
Variable   Sample  Value 
Average Household Income      $67,767 
Average  Age         54.2 
Percent  male       54 
Percent with child aged 1-16      19 
Percent who live in rural location 
a   45 
  
Market Share of Cars and Light Trucks by Manufacturer’s Geographic Origin: 





a A rural location is defined as being outside of an MSA of 1 million people or more.  
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Each consumer’s choice set consisted of the 200 makes and models of new 2000 
vehicles.  We treated a number of manufacturers that merged in the late 1990s, for example, 
Daimler-Benz and Chrysler, as offering distinct makes because it was likely that 
consumers had not yet perceived that their vehicles were made by the same manufacturer.  
Indeed, we obtained more satisfactory statistical fits under this assumption than using the 
merged entity as a unit of analysis.  Given this choice set, we estimated a mixed logit model 
that included brand loyalty, product line and distribution variables, and vehicle attributes 
interacted with consumer characteristics, error components, and an alternative specific 
constant for each vehicle make and model. The estimated constants, which capture average 
utility, were then regressed against vehicle attributes using instrumental variables.   
Table 4 presents estimation results for all parts of the model because each part 
contributes to consumers’ utility.  The first panel gives coefficients for two specifications 
of average utility; for reasons explained below, one specification does not include the 
retained value and the other does. The second panel contains the estimated coefficients for 
the variation in utility that relates to consumers’ observed characteristics; and the third, 
coefficients for the error components, assumed to be normally distributed, that capture 
variation in utility that is not related to observed characteristics. Alternative distributions 
for the error components such as the lognormal did not produce fits as satisfactory as the 
normal. 
 
Table 4. Vehicle Demand Model Parameter Estimates* 
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Utility that varies over consumers related to observed 
characteristics: elements of  nj x β′  
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 






Vehicle reliability based on the Consumer Reports’ repair index for 





Luxury or sports car dummy for lessors (1 if the vehicle is a luxury 




Minivan and full-sized van dummy for households with an 
adolescent (1 if the vehicle is a van and the respondent’s 




SUV or station wagon dummy for households with an adolescent (1 
if vehicle is a SUV or Wagon and the respondent’s household 




ln(1+Number of dealerships within 50 Miles of the center of a 









Number of previous consecutive GM purchases for respondents 

























Utility that varies over consumers unrelated to observed 
characteristics (error components): elements of  nj nw µ′ ns λη +  
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Manufacturer’s suggested retail price divided by respondent’s 
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Fuel consumption (gallons of gasoline per mile) times a random 





Light truck, van, or pickup dummy (1 if vehicle is a light truck, van, 








*Estimated coefficients for vehicle make and model dummies not shown. 
  Number of observations: 458 
  Log likelihood at convergence for choice model: -1994.93 
  R
2 for regression model: 0.394 without retained value, 0.395 with retained value. 
 
a.  The Consumer Reports’ repair index is a measure of reliability that uses integer values from 1 to 5.  A 
measure of 1 indicates the vehicle has a “much below average” repair record, 3 is “average,” while 5 
represents “much better than average” reliability. 
b.  A dealership is defined as a retail location capable of selling a vehicle produced by a given division. The 
dealership variable is equal to 0,1,2, or 3 (with 3 representing areas with 3 or more dealerships within a 
fifty-mile radius of the center of the respondent’s zip code). This variable is defined for divisions (not 
manufacturers), because a Chevrolet dealership might sell Chevrolet vehicles without selling Saturn 
vehicles (GM manufactures both Chevrolet and Saturn). 
c.  A respondent is classified as living in a rural location if he or she does not live in a Metropolitan     
       Statistical Area or lives in a Metropolitan Statistical Area with less than 1 million people. 
 
Price coefficients   
Consumers’ response to a change in the price of a given vehicle is captured by an 
average effect, an effect that varies with income, and an effect that varies over consumers 
with the same income.  That is, for the model without retained value, the estimate of the 
derivative of utility with respect to price is: 
-0.073 -1.60/consumer income +0.86 η/consumer income, 
 where η is distributed standard normal.  As previously indicated, the first term is estimated 
using instrumental variables (IV); when ordinary least squares (OLS) is used the 
coefficient falls to –0.043 indicating that omitted attributes are correlated with price and 
that it is important to correct for endogeneity in estimation.  Based on these coefficients, 
the average price elasticity for all vehicles is -2.32, which is consistent with estimates 
obtained by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (2004).
13 
                                                 
13 The elasticities are calculated as the percent change in predicted market share that results from a one 
percent change in price, where predicted market shares are obtained by integrating over both observed and  
 
   26  
 
When a vehicle’s expected retained value is specified as an additional explanatory 
variable, it appears to play an important role in controlling for the endogeneity of price.  
We isolate this effect in table 5, which reports the coefficients for the purchase price and 
the retained value estimated by OLS and IV. Given that the retained value is derived from 
the purchase price, it is likely to be correlated with unobserved attributes of the vehicle and 
should therefore be estimated by IV.  As noted, when we include price but not the retained 
value in the specification, the difference between the OLS and IV estimates indicated a 
considerable degree of endogeneity.  But when we also include the retained value, it 
appears to absorb most of the endogeneity bias while the OLS and IV estimates of the 
purchase price are very similar. This finding suggests that unobserved attributes are 
correlated with a vehicle’s retained value but not with the difference between its price and 
retained value (i.e., expected vehicle depreciation). 
 
Table 5. Estimated Price Coefficients and Elasticities for Models 
With and Without the Retained Value 
 
  Model without 
retained value 
Model with  
retained value 
 OLS  IV  OLS  IV 













elasticity  -1.7 -2.3 -3.2 -2.9 
                                            
 
Note that the retained value represents about 60 percent, on average, of the 
purchase price (as measured by the MSRP) of a vehicle; thus, the combined effect, 
regardless of whether it is estimated by OLS or IV, of the retained value and price on 
                                                                                                                                                 
unobserved consumer attributes. A separate elasticity is calculated for each make and model of vehicle. The 
average given in the text is over all makes and models.  
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average utility is roughly the same as the effect of price when it is entered by itself.  This 
relationship suggests that the model with the retained value effectively decomposes the 
two components of price to which a consumer responds.  Moreover, holding retained value 
constant, table 5 shows that consumers’ response to price (i.e., the average price elasticity) 
is clearly higher than when the retained value is allowed to vary.  The reason is that the 
retained value is determined by competitive used-vehicle markets; hence, if a manufacturer 
raises the price of a new vehicle without improving its attributes, the retained value will not 
rise proportionately and may not rise at all.  
As expected, the separate price effects are estimated with less precision than the 
combined effect.  Indeed, the estimated coefficient of retained value obtains a t-statistic of 
only 0.5, which suggests that the hypothesis that consumers do not differentiate between 
the two components of price cannot be rejected. Nonetheless, the pattern of estimates is 
consistent with rational behavior and a plausible form of endogeneity, and may have 
important implications for estimating the price elasticity that is actually relevant to firms’ 
behavior.  It therefore seems reasonable to maintain the concept of retained value as a 
potential influence among the set of vehicle attributes affecting consumer choice and 
subject it to further exploration in future research.
14   
 
Other coefficients   
The non-price vehicle attributes in table 4 enter utility with plausible signs and are 
nearly always statistically significant.  Vehicle reliability, horsepower divided by curb 
weight, automatic transmission included as standard equipment, wheelbase, and vehicle 
length beyond the wheelbase have a positive effect on the likelihood of choosing a given 
vehicle, while fuel consumption per mile (the inverse of miles per gallon) has a negative 
                                                 
14 The inclusion of retained value may alternatively be interpreted as an application of Matzkin’s (2004) 
method of correcting for endogeneity.  Retained value would qualify as the extra variable needed for 
Matzkin’s approach if it is related to the price only through exogenous perturbations, but is correlated with 
the unobserved attributes of a vehicle.  Under these conditions, the original error term may be expressed as a 
function of the retained value and a new error term that is independent of all explanatory variables including 
price, which would permit OLS estimation of the regression to yield consistent parameter estimates.  As 
expected from an endogeneity correction, the OLS estimate of the price coefficient rises when the retained 
value is included in the model (compare the OLS estimate in the third column of table 5 with the OLS 
estimate in the first column) and is similar to the IV estimate of the price coefficient (in the second column).  
We also estimated the function of retained value non-parametrically and obtained essentially the same results 
as when we specified retained value linearly.      
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effect.  Note that wheelbase tends to reflect the size of the passenger compartment and 
therefore, as expected, has a larger coefficient than vehicle length beyond the wheelbase.  
Other measures of vehicle size, such as width and a proxy for interior volume, did not have 
statistically significant effects.  We also performed estimations that included engine size 
(in liters), but it had a statistically insignificant effect. 
Our findings that the (dis)utility of price is inversely related to income and that 
reliability has a positive and statistically significant effect on utility for women over 30 
years of age but has an insignificant effect for men and for women under 30 exemplify 
observed heterogeneity in consumer preferences.  Other examples are that consumers who 
lease a vehicle are more likely to engage in upgrade behavior by choosing a luxury or 
sports car than consumers who purchase a vehicle (Mannering, Winston, and Starkey 
(2002) discuss this phenomenon), and that households with adolescents are more likely 
than other households to choose a van or SUV presumably to use for work and non-work 
trips.   
Unobserved preference heterogeneity is captured in error components related to 
vehicle price, horsepower, fuel consumption, and consumers’ preferences for cars versus 
trucks (including light trucks, vans, and SUVs).
15  The last coefficient reflects greater 
substitution among cars and among trucks than across these categories, which is confirmed 
by our estimates of vehicle cross-elasticities.  For example, we find that the cross-elasticity 
of demand with respect to the price of a given make and model of a van is, on average: 
0.038 for other makes and models of vans; 0.026 for makes and models of SUVs; 0.018 for 
makes and models of pickup trucks; 0.0025 for makes and models of regular cars; and 
0.0021 for makes and models of sports and luxury vehicles.
16  As  expected, 
cross-elasticities are higher for more similar types of vehicles. We also found reasonable 
cross-elasticity patterns for the prices of other vehicle types.  In contrast, a model that 
                                                 
15 These components were determined after extensive testing of a variety of specifications, including models 
that allowed the densities to depend on income and other variables.  We were not able to identify any other 
statistically significant influences on the components beyond those captured in the fixed portion of utility (i.e., 
the mean of the error components).  Recall that we could not identify significant error components without 
including data on considered vehicles, which suggests that the data contain limited information on the 
distribution of unobserved taste variation.   
16 To put the magnitude of the cross-elasticities in perspective: if a vehicle had a market share of 0.005 (i.e., 
the average share because there are 200 makes and models of vehicles) and had an own-price elasticity of 
–3.0, then the cross-price elasticity for each other vehicle, assuming it did not vary, would be 0.0151.  
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maintained the IIA property would restrict the cross-elasticity of demand with respect to a 
given vehicle’s price to be the same for all vehicles; that is, IIA implies that the elasticity of 
vehicle j’s demand with respect to a change in vehicle i’s price is the same for all . i j ≠  . 
Surprisingly, we found that, all else constant, consumers were not more likely to 
purchase a vehicle from automakers that offered a large (or small) number of models or 
that produced a “hot car.”  We explored various definitions of a hot car to construct its 
dummy variable, based on deviations from mean sales and sales growth, but they were all 
statistically insignificant.  We also specified hot car dummies based on vehicle size 
classifications but they were also statistically insignificant.   Although automakers cannot 
rely on product line “externalities” to improve their sales, we found that their dealer 
network does have a statistically significant effect on choice. We constructed the 
dealership variable by division as the natural log of one plus the actual number of dealers 
within 50 miles of the consumer up to a maximum of three.  Thus, the variable takes on a 
value of zero if no dealers within the circumscribed area sell the vehicle.  In addition, the 
functional form assumes that the impact of having one dealer instead of none is greater 
than the extra impact of having a second dealer instead of one, and so on, with the impact of 
additional dealers negligible beyond three. This specification fit the data better than a 
linear specification, indicating that it is important for automakers to have a dealer within 
reasonable proximity to potential customers but that additional dealers will have a 
diminishing impact on sales.     
Finally, we included separate brand loyalty variables for GM, Ford, and Chrysler as 
well as for the Japanese and European automakers as distinct groups. Preliminary 
estimations indicated that it was statistically justifiable to aggregate the Japanese and 
European automakers into single loyalty variables. We could not estimate a brand loyalty 
parameter for Korean automakers because only one consumer in the sample chose a 
Korean vehicle in their most recent previous purchase.  The estimated coefficients are 
positive, statistically significant, and fairly large while the error component for brand 
(manufacturer) loyalty is statistically significant.  We found that the likelihood function 
increased when we used the conditional distribution of n η rather than its unconditional 
distribution, which indicates that conditioning provides useful information about 
consumers’ choices.   
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When our estimates are assessed in the context of previous findings that use the 
same measure of brand loyalty as used here, it becomes clear that loyalties have undergone 
considerable shifts as consumers have gained experience with and adjusted to new 
information about automakers’ products.  Mannering and Winston (1991) found that 
during the 1970s, American consumers had the greatest brand loyalty toward Chrysler, had 
comparable loyalty toward GM and Japanese automakers, and the least loyalty for Ford.  
During the 1980s, after American consumers developed greater experience with Japanese 
vehicles, Mannering and Winston found that loyalty toward Japanese automakers 
exceeded loyalty toward any American automaker.  But during the mid-1990s, as 
American consumers gained experience with certain automakers by leasing their vehicles 
and purchasing a greater share of light trucks, Mannering, Winston, and Starkey (2002) 
found that American consumers developed strong brand loyalty toward European 
automakers and revived some of their loyalty toward American firms.   
Our brand loyalty estimates indicate that this recent shift is intact because 
consumers have the strongest loyalty toward European automakers while loyalty for Ford 
and Chrysler now exceeds loyalty toward Japanese automakers.  Of course, Ford’s and 
Chrysler’s loyalty coefficients may indicate that as their market shares have fallen, they 
have retained a smaller but more loyal group of customers.  GM has the least loyalty and, in 
contrast to Ford and Chrysler, appears to be retaining only loyal rural customers as its share 
falls.    
We stress that our interpretations should be qualified on theoretical grounds 
because the loyalty coefficients could also be capturing heterogeneity in tastes.  We cannot 
resolve the theoretical debate, but we did explore additional empirical treatments of brand 
loyalty to shed light on the validity of our interpretation.  In particular, if the phenomenon 
we are capturing were unobserved tastes for vehicle types, then it is likely that such tastes 
would be correlated with at least some of the vehicle attributes in the model. But, as noted 
earlier, when we performed estimations without a manufacturer error component and 
without including the brand loyalty variables, the other (non-brand loyalty) parameters 
were nearly the same as those presented in table 4.  Of course, this exploration does not rule 
out the possibility that the loyalty variables themselves are subject to endogeneity bias; but 
at a minimum it indicates that such bias does not affect the other parameters of the model,  
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which is an important consideration when we assess the sources of changes in market 
shares.   
 
5. Assessing the U.S. Automakers’ Decline 
 
The main purpose of the vehicle choice model is to guide an exploratory 
assessment of the ongoing decline in U.S. automakers’ market share.  As discussed in the 
introduction, several hypotheses that explain the decline could be derived from the 
academic literature and the views of industry observers and participants including changes 
in basic vehicle attributes, subtle vehicle attributes, unobserved tastes, brand loyalty, 
product line characteristics, and distribution outlets.   
The findings obtained from the vehicle choice model narrow the range of possible 
explanations to vehicle attributes and unobserved tastes.  The statistically insignificant 
parameter estimates for the product line variables and the apparent relative improvement in 
brand loyalty for Ford and Chrysler suggest that these factors are unlikely to have been a 
major source of the industry’s loss in market share.  Foreign automakers have improved 
their distribution networks over time, but U.S. automakers compete effectively in this 
dimension. Thus, we first focus on the impact of changes in basic vehicle attributes during 
the past decade on U.S. automakers’ market shares and if necessary turn to less observable 
factors.     
We use data on the vehicles offered in 1990 and their attributes to forecast the 
change in U.S. automakers’ market share attributable to changes in vehicle attributes given 
consumers’ tastes in 2000.  Data for vehicle offerings and attributes in 1990 were obtained 
from Consumer Reports, Automotive News’ Market Data Book, and Wards’ Automotive 
Yearbook.  Prices for vehicles in 1990 were expressed in 2000 dollars.  By construction, 
forecasted shares equal actual shares in 2000 when the forecasts are obtained with the 
choice probabilities ni P estimated in table 4.  These forecasts rely on δj for all j, including its 
unobserved component ξj.  The values of the ξj ’s are not known for vehicles in any year 
other than that used in estimation. To forecast what market shares would have been in 2000 
given 1990 basic vehicle attributes and offerings, we adopted an approach that is similar to  
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that implemented by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (2004). For any 1990 vehicle that was 
still offered under the same model name in 2000, we used the estimated value of ξj for that 
vehicle in 2000. For 1990 vehicles that did not continue into 2000, we used the average of 
ξj over 2000 vehicles of the same type (i.e., SUV, van, pickup, sports, and other) by the 
same manufacturer (with Japanese, European, and other manufacturers each grouped.)
17 
By utilizing this procedure for the ξj ’s, our forecasts (and changes in shares) represent the 
impact of changes in the observed basic attributes of vehicles between 1990 and 2000 but 
not changes in unobserved attributes.  As noted below, we explored two other procedures 
for treating the  ξj ‘s in our forecasts. 
Market shares are forecasted for the 1990 vehicle offerings and attributes, thereby 
allowing us to compare consumers’ 2000 choices with a prediction of what vehicles they 
would have purchased in 2000 had they been offered the vehicles (and attributes) that were 
available in 1990.  A simple consumer surplus calculation based on the familiar “log sum” 
expression for the logit model indicated that all of the automakers (by geographical origin) 
improved the attributes of their vehicles over the decade. Thus, the change in U.S. 
automakers’ market share predicted by the model reflects the relative improvement in their 
vehicles. 
We find that the relative change in American manufacturers’ offerings and 
attributes was responsible for the industry losing 6.34 percentage points of market share, 
which accounts for almost all of the 6.80 percentage points of market share that the U.S. 
industry actually lost during the past decade.
18 Our sample is not large enough to 
provide reliable breakdowns by automaker and vehicle classification; however, we can 
                                                 
17 We obtained an indication of the impact of this type of averaging of the ξj ’s by applying the procedure in 
forecasts for 2000, using the estimated ξj   for 2000 vehicles that also existed in 1990 and using the 
manufacturer/type averages for 2000 vehicles that did not also exist in 1990. The forecasted share of US 
manufactures based on this procedure was 0.65625 compared with the actual share of 0.65650, indicating that 
averaging has little impact on forecasts of US manufacturers’ share. 
18  We also forecasted the changes in market shares using two other ways of handling the unobserved 
attributes of vehicles, ξj. In one procedure, we integrated the choice probabilities over the empirical 
distribution of the unobserved attributes. That is, for each vehicle we randomly chose a value of ξj from the 
values estimated for the year 2000 vehicles; we repeated the forecasts numerous times and averaged the 
results. The estimated change in market share for U.S. manufacturers was 6.71, which is even closer to the 
6.80 change that actually occurred. Second, following a suggestion of Steven Berry, we used a variant on this 
integration procedure in which the correlation between price and unobserved attributes is incorporated. The 
estimated change was essentially the same as in the first procedure. 
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report that virtually all segments of the American manufacturers’ products experienced 
some loss in market share.  This important but disturbing finding suggests that although 
the American industry has received various kinds of trade protection for more than two 
decades ostensibly to help it “retool” and has benefited from robust macroeconomic 
expansions during the 1980s and 1990s, it continues to lag behind foreign competitors 
when it comes to producing a vehicle with desirable attributes. It is particularly 
noteworthy that the loss of the American industry’s market share can be explained by 
changes in the basic attributes—price, fuel consumption, horsepower, and so on—that 
are included in our model, rather than subtle attributes such as styling and various 
options or unobserved tastes.
19   
We performed a simulation to determine how much U.S. manufacturers would 
have to reduce their prices in 2000 to attain the same market share in 2000 that they had 
in 1990 and found that prices would have to fall more than 50 percent. This large price 
reduction is reasonable because U.S. manufacturers’ market share in 2000 is roughly 
two-thirds and the price elasticity with respect to a simultaneous change in all U.S. 
vehicle prices is small.  (The price elasticities between -2.0 and -3.0 that we reported 
previously refer to the change in the price of an individual make and model of a vehicle.) 
Although it would not be profit maximizing for U.S. firms to contemplate such a 
strategy, they have recently attempted to retain and possibly recover some of their 
market share by offering much larger incentives than foreign automakers offer.   
However, even this short-term fix has had little effect on their sales; as suggested by our 
simulation, the price reductions that would be needed to affect their share are 
considerably larger than those that have been offered.  Indeed, despite offering 
incentives in 2005 that were as much as $3,000 per vehicle greater than the incentives 
offered by Japanese manufacturers, U.S. automakers’ market share of cars and light 
trucks in that year fell 2 percentage points from its share in the previous year.     
In contrast to the U.S. automakers, European firms’ market share increased some 
                                                 
19 We also forecast the impact of the changes in dealership networks that occurred from 1990 to 2000 and 
found that the change in dealership networks resulted in a loss of 0.5 percentage points for U.S. 
manufacturers. This predicted loss is very small, indicating that the relative improvement in foreign 
automakers’ networks is not an important factor in the decline of U.S. manufacturers’ share.  However, 
combining this loss in share with the loss due to changes in basic vehicle attributes enables us to account for 
the entire loss of 6.8 percentage points that actually occurred.  
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five percentage points over the decade, partly because they intensified competitive 
pressure on the U.S. automakers by offering attractive entry-level luxury vehicles such as 
the restyled BMW 3-series.  Indeed, European automakers achieved a net gain of 12 new 
vehicle models over the decade, while U.S. and Japanese automakers’ net change was 
negligible.  Japanese automakers gained roughly a percentage point of share as they 
expanded their presence in the higher (and more profitable) end of the market with various 




  Concerns about the competitiveness of the U.S. automobile industry developed in 
the early 1980s when Chrysler needed a bailout from the federal government to avoid 
financial collapse and Ford and General Motors suffered large losses.  Since then, the 
profitability of the domestic industry has fluctuated while its market share has steadily 
declined.  Investors in the stock market, who are the most experienced and credible 
soothsayers of an industry’s future, envision that difficult times lie ahead for Ford, General 
Motors, and Daimler-Chrysler as the sum of their current market capitalization is less than 
half the combined market capitalization of Honda, Toyota, and Nissan and less than 
Toyota’s market capitalization alone.  Toyota’s consistent profitability has allowed it to 
invest in fuel-efficient hybrid engine systems for compact and luxury cars, and to take risks, 
like starting a youth-focused brand, Scion, thereby increasing pressure on other 
automakers.  
We have attempted to shed light on the U.S. industry’s current predicament by 
applying recent econometric advances to analyze the vehicle choices of American 
consumers. Notwithstanding these advances, we have been confronted with some 
formidable methodological challenges that necessitated some compromises. We have 
identified the advantages and limitations of our approach while setting the stage for future 
research.   
We have found that the U.S. automakers’ loss in market share during the past 
decade can be explained almost entirely by the difference in the basic attributes that 
measure the quality and value of their vehicles.  Recent efforts by U.S. firms to offset this 
disadvantage by offering much larger incentives than foreign automakers offer have not  
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met with much success.  In contrast to the numerous hypotheses that have been proffered to 
explain the industry’s problems, our findings lead to the conclusion that the only way for 
the U.S. industry to stop its decline is to improve the basic attributes of their vehicles as 
rapidly as foreign competitors have been able to improve the basic attributes of theirs.   The 
failure of U.S. automobile firms to address this fundamental deficiency suggests that these 
organizations may be saddled with constraints that researchers and industry analysts have 
yet to identify.   
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